The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Read online

  The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. (35) Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. [9b] Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. (5) What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.

  Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, (10) are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, (15) that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, (20) are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, (25) and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these.

  Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such and such in virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, (30) nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.

  In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. (35) That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. [10a] I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such. (5)

  Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections. (10)

  The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, (15) or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.

  Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, (20) owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.

  There may be other sorts of quality, (25) but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.

  These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. (30) Thus the terms ‘whiteness’, ‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the adjectives ‘white’, ‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on.

  There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, (35) the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for those capacities have no name assigned to them. [10b] In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e. g., boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘boxing’ or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science.

  Sometimes, (5) even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does not occur often.

  We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, (10) or which are in some other way dependent on it.

  One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, (15) that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries.

  If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, (20) granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality. (25)

  Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.

  Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, (30) difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, (35) but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. [11a] However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.

  The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and ‘quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, (5) nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to
which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, (10) for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.

  Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, (15) the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality.

  We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, (20) though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, (25) for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, (30) are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said to be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something.

  Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. (35) Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.

  9 [11b] Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. (5) They also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories.

  We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes.

  As for the rest, (10) time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as ‘shod’, ‘armed’, in that of place ‘in the Lyceum’ and so on, as was explained before.

  10 The proposed categories have, (15) then, been adequately dealt with.

  We must next explain the various senses in which the term ‘opposite’ is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.

  Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word ‘opposite’ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions ‘double’ and ‘half’; with reference to contraries by ‘bad’ and ‘good’. (20) Opposites in the sense of ‘privatives’ and ‘positives’ are ‘blindness’ and ‘sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’.

  (i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition ‘of’ or by some other preposition. (25) Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, (30) knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something; that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other.

  (ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, (35) nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. [12a] Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. (5) Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. (10) Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things, (15) but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.

  Some intermediate qualities have names, (20) such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, (25) as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.

  (iii) ‘Privatives’ and ‘positives’ have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular ‘positive’ is natural. We say that that which is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, (30) and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.

  To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding ‘privative’ or ‘positive’. (35) ‘Sight’ is a ‘positive’, ‘blindness’ a ‘privative’, but ‘to possess sight’ is not equivalent to ‘sight’, ‘to be blind’ is not equivalent to ‘blindness’. Blindness is a ‘privative’, to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a ‘privative’. Moreover, if ‘blindness’ were equivalent to ‘being blind’, (40) both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness.

  [12b] To be in a state of ‘possession’ is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of ‘privation’, just as ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, (5) so is being blind opposed to having sight.

  That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. By ‘affirmation’ we mean an affirmative propos
ition, by ‘denial’ a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, (10) for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’, so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, (15) to his not sitting.

  It is evident that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. (20) Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness. (25)

  That those terms which fall under the heads of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, (30) as we proved, in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject. (35) We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, (40) or snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. [13a] Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present.